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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & INTRODUCTION
1  David Brunnstrom and Susan Cornwell, “NATO Promises Ukraine, Georgia Entry One Day,” Reuters, April 3, 2008, https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-nato/nato-promises-ukraine-georgia-entry-one-day-idUSL0179714620080403. 
To endure and succeed, a nation’s foreign pol-icy must advance its interests and reflect its values. After World War II, US statesmen and their European partners built an internation-
al order based on principles that promoted liberty 
and provided a basis for economic growth. The insti-
tutions that made this possible included the United 
Nations, the European Union (and its predecessors), 
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and 
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (which be-
came the World Trade Organization). To defend this 
liberal order from the aggressive designs of the Soviet 
Union, Western statesmen created NATO.
The success of these policies was historic. The 
European continent, which had launched two world 
wars in the space of twenty-five years, experienced no 
hot war for more than fifty years (with the exception of 
Greek-Turkish fighting in Cyprus). Security and stability 
in Europe, coupled with free-market economic policies, 
provided a basis for strong economic growth, and the 
great danger posed by a hostile Soviet Union vanished 
as that nation imploded in 1991.
Western policymakers, particularly those in the United 
States, reacted to the end of the Cold War by applying 
the same liberal principles to the nations that emerged 
from the Soviet rubble. They developed programs to 
help these nations transform from authoritarianism to 
democracy, and to build a market economy. They spon-
sored these countries’ memberships in key Western 
political and economic institutions. And, in visionary 
moments, these policymakers proclaimed a desire 
to create a Europe “whole and free,” from the Bay of 
Biscay to Vladivostok or, including North America, from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok.
The policies that the West pursued regarding the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War formed a kind of 
grand strategy, but no formal strategy toward Russia 
replaced it at the end of the Cold War. Although there 
was much discussion in foreign policy journals about 
the need for a new, overarching concept to replace 
“containment,” none appeared.
In the first post-Cold War decade, this policy seemed 
to face no real opposition. The former nations of the 
Soviet empire were expected to share the vision. That 
included Russia, which, under President Boris Yeltsin, 
was a developing democracy. 
This began to change after President Vladimir Putin 
took power in 2000. In his first year in office, Putin took 
control of the major television stations; from there, he 
moved the country in an authoritarian direction—or, as 
he likes to say, toward a “managed democracy.” He also 
began to push back against the concept of a liberal in-
ternational order and the right of nations that had once 
been part of the Soviet Union, or even the broader 
Soviet empire, to make their own national security de-
cisions, particularly decisions to join NATO, or even the 
EU. Significantly, Russian pushback included wars in 
Georgia and Ukraine that changed the map of Europe, 
and regular provocations against the Baltic states. 
The Kremlin’s hostile policies were a direct rebuke of 
the vision of a Europe whole and free. Instead of a uni-
fied Europe, the Kremlin presented a vision of itself as a 
unique civilization, and as a center of power with Europe 
to its west and China to its east. Moscow further insisted 
on its right to control the policies of its near neighbors 
in the borderlands, commonly known in Russia as the 
“Near Abroad,” between itself and Europe.
Moscow’s new belligerence gave Western leaders 
pause. This was evident even before Moscow’s August 
2008 attack on Georgia. At the NATO Bucharest 
Summit in the spring of 2008, US efforts to establish a 
Membership Action Plan for Georgia and Ukraine failed 
in the face of Germany, France, and others’ reluctance 
to “provoke” Putin.1 That was a mistake, as the decision 
instead emboldened the Kremlin to go to war against 
Georgia months later. 
The thesis of this paper flows from this logic.
Kremlin opposition to the notion of a Europe whole 
and free has given new life to the old concept of bor-
derlands, the territory between large independent 
powers. Moscow argues that the West should cede to 
its dictates to control at least the national security pol-
icies of its near neighbors.
The West should reject Moscow’s claim. It contradicts 
Western principles and is dangerous to Western in-
terests. The US should lead the West in adopting an 
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explicit strategy of promoting democracy, an open 
society and open markets throughout Europe and 
Eurasia, as well as the right of nations in this area to 
choose their own foreign policy and alignments. This 
includes their right, if they meet the conditions, to join 
the EU and NATO.
Advocates of accommodating Moscow think they 
are buying peace and stability. That is an illusion. 
Such accommodation makes the borderlands places 
of Kremlin aggression and instability. While the West 
accepts Kremlin control under this option, there is no 
reason to assume that the people of these regions are 
willing to forfeit their futures to autocrats in Moscow. 
So, Western principles and interests would be served 
by policies that back the aspirations of the nations in 
these areas to determine their own futures. The likely 
result would be the erasing of the borderlands, and the 
creation of a Europe whole and free.
The triumph of the notion of a Europe “whole and free” Berlin, November 1989.  Photo credit: University of Minnesota Institute of 
Advanced Studies
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BORDERLANDS AND THEIR DISCONTENTS
2  Yalta Conference, “Section II – Declaration of a Liberated Europe,” February 1945, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/yalta.asp. 
3  US Department of State Office of the Historian, “Helsinki Final Act, 1975,” https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/helsinki. 
4  OECD, “Charter of Paris for a New Europe,” November 21, 1990, https://www.osce.org/mc/39516. 
Territories between great powers—borderlands—have historically been areas of strife. In antiqui-ty, the Roman Empire fought repeatedly with first the Parthian Empire, and then the Sasanian 
Empire, over Armenia, Syria, and Mesopotamia. In the 
nineteenth century, the British Raj in India and an ex-
panding Russian Empire in Central Asia competed in 
the “Great Game” for influence in Afghanistan. In early 
twentieth-century Europe, imperial rivalries and ethnic 
ambitions provided the spark that ignited World War 
I. The infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in August 
of 1939 erased the borderlands in East and Central 
Europe as the Soviets seized the eastern half and the 
Nazis the western half. World War II began nine days 
after its signing. 
World War II ended in Europe as US and British forces 
from the west, and Soviet forces from the east, con-
verged on Germany. The post-World War II order in 
Europe was hammered out in the great conferences at 
Yalta and Potsdam. In these gatherings, the Western 
powers initially insisted on the right of people to 
choose their own governments and futures; some doc-
uments signed by all parties, like the Declaration of a 
Liberated Europe, gave voice to these principles.2 But, 
with Soviet forces on the ground throughout Eastern 
Europe and no Western willingness to confront them, 
there was little prospect that truly independent nations 
would emerge there—and they did not.
As the euphoria of defeating Adolf Hitler gave way to 
the realities of the Cold War, the nations of Western 
Europe banded together with the United States and 
Canada to create the defensive NATO alliance to deter 
Soviet aggression. To shore up European stability 
during that period, the United States also provided bil-
lions of dollars of aid under the Marshall Plan. But, to 
forestall US influence In Eastern Europe, the Soviets 
persuaded their allies not to seek Marshall Plan sup-
port. In response to the establishment of NATO, the 
Soviet Union created the Warsaw Pact and insisted 
that the nations of Eastern Europe become members.
The result was that, in the years following World War 
II, two opposing camps emerged in Europe—with 
no intervening territory. In the north, NATO member 
Norway bordered the Soviet Union. On the southern 
end, Turkey anchored NATO, and likewise shared a bor-
der with the Soviet Union. In the heart of Europe, NATO 
nations bordered Warsaw Pact nations. In the middle 
was Austria, which was officially neutral, by the treaty 
under which Soviet forces left the country. 
The Post-Cold War Security Order
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw 
Pact changed all of this. Fifteen independent na-
tions emerged from the Soviet Union: Russia, the 
three Baltic states, the five Central Asian states, the 
three states of the Caucasus, and Belarus, Moldova, 
and Ukraine. Moscow’s six Warsaw Pact allies—
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania—also found themselves truly in-
dependent. East Germany joined a united Germany 
and Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia. Yugoslavia, a socialist state that never 
joined the Warsaw Pact, fractured violently into seven 
new states: Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, the 
Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia.
Post-Cold War Europe and Eurasia established a new 
security order. The Helsinki Final Act, which was signed 
in 1975,3 served as the basis for this new order. The 
Charter of Paris (1990) ratified these principles.4 The 
most important are
  the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states;
  the right of states to choose their own political and 
economic systems, and their own foreign policy 
and security arrangements;
  the peaceful settlement of disputes among states 
by negotiations, and in accordance with interna-
tional law; and
  the inadmissibility of resolving interstate disputes 
by war.  
These principles were designed to provide security 
and freedom to all of the states of Europe and Eurasia. 
Consistent with them, the three Baltic states chose to 
join NATO and the EU. Ten other states joined NATO, 
and eight the EU. 
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These developments were also consistent with the vi-
sion of Western statesmen to integrate the nations that 
came out of the Soviet Empire, including Russia, into 
the liberal institutions created in the years after World 
War II—the UN, the IMF, the World Bank and the World 
Trade Organization. That vision also included creating 
a Europe whole and free.
By most measures, the security order created after 
the fall of the Soviet Union has been a great success. 
Despite the myriad security challenges that have 
arisen—global terrorism, chaos in the Middle East, 
North Korea’s nuclear program—the past quarter cen-
tury has avoided war between major powers, and the 
accompanying economic ruin and loss of life. Today, 
5  Adam Taylor, “For the First Time, Less than 10 Percent of the World Is Living in Extreme Poverty, World Bank Says,” Washington Post, 
October 5, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/10/05/for-the-first-time-less-than-10-percent-of-the-
world-is-living-in-extreme-poverty-world-bank-says/?utm_term=.f664a201a0ca. 
6  Trading Economics, “Poland GDP per Capita PPP 1990-2018,” https://tradingeconomics.com/poland/gdp-per-capita-ppp. 
7  Trading Economics, “Bulgaria GDP per Capita 1980-2018,” https://tradingeconomics.com/bulgaria/gdp-per-capita. 
less than 10 percent of the world’s population lives in 
extreme poverty.5 At the end of World War II, that num-
ber was more than 70 percent. 
The benefits of this post-Cold War world have been 
evident In Europe. All of the nations that joined the EU 
and NATO have established working democracies and 
made great economic progress. Poland, for instance, 
currently enjoys a GDP per-capita purchasing parity 
power (PPP) of $27,216.44 USD, up from $9,521.78 in 
1991.6 Bulgaria has seen an increase of more than 50 
percent in GDP per-capita PPP, sitting at $8,311.93 from 
an average of $4,992.74 between 1980 and 2017.7 In the 
Baltics, Estonia has seen similar improvements, with 
GDP per-capita PPP reaching $18,977.39 from a low 
Protesters on the Maidan, embracing the vision set out by West.  Photo credit: Maksymenko Oleksandr
Beyond Borderlands: Ensuring the Sovereignty of All Nations of Eastern Europe
6 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
of $7,313.74 in 1995.8 The current problems facing the 
continent—such as the immigration crisis and Brexit—
are partly a result of the economic boom that it has 
enjoyed over the past quarter century.
A Revisionist Russia Emerges
Yet, every silver lining has its cloud; in this case, the 
cloud began to gather over Moscow. In the 1990s, a 
newly independent Russia moved in the direction of de-
mocracy, and sought help from the West in transform-
ing its economy. Despite some complaints about NATO 
enlargement and NATO’s policies in the Bosnia and 
Kosovo crises, Moscow did not push back hard against 
the West’s vision of a liberal, democratic Europe.
This began to change after Putin succeeded Yeltsin as 
president of Russia. In his first years as president, Putin 
maintained Yeltsin’s policies of basic cooperation with 
the West, and focused on paying off Russia’s foreign 
debt, which he saw as a national security liability. With 
the sharp rise in the price of oil and gas—Russia’s major 
export products—in the early 2000s, Russia prospered 
as never before.9 But, even as cooperation with the 
West continued, Putin asserted Russia’s privileged sta-
tus in its neighborhood, the Near Abroad; his first trip 
as president was to neighboring Uzbekistan.10
Significantly, Putin began to act immediately to consol-
idate his power, at the expense of Russian democracy. 
In his first year in office, Putin took control of Russia’s 
major television stations from their oligarch owners. 
In ensuing years, he curbed the political activities of 
oligarchs (such as the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky), 
replaced elected regional governors with appoin-
tees, reduced the legal space for opposition activi-
ties, and used the politically controlled justice system 
8  Trading Economics, “Estonia GDP per Capita 1995-2018,” https://tradingeconomics.com/estonia/gdp-per-capita. 
9  Dr. Sergey Aleksashenko, The Russian Economy: Short-Term Resilience, Long-Term Stagnation (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2018), 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/the-russian-economy-short-term-resilience-long-term-stagnation. 
10  Timur Abdullaev, “Uzbekistan Maneuvers,” Perspective vol. 14, no. 4, June/July, 2004, https://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol14/Abdullaev.html. 
11  Masha Gessen, “The Wrath of Putin,” Vanity Fair, January 30, 2015, https://www.vanityfair.com/news/politics/2012/04/vladimir-
putin-mikhail-khodorkovsky-russia; “Russian Duma Backs Putin Reforms,” BBC, October 29, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/3965845.stm; Ann M. Simmons, “Vladimir Putin’s 18 Years in Power—the Highs and Lows, and Don’t Forget the Shirtless Pics,” 
Los Angeles Times, March 19, 2018, http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-vladimir-putin-timeline-20180319-story.html; “Alexei 
Navalny: Russia’s Vociferous Putin Critic,” BBC, March 15, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-16057045.   
12  Shaun Walker, “The Murder That Killed Free Media in Russia,” Guardian, October 5, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/
oct/05/ten-years-putin-press-kremlin-grip-russia-media-tightens; Andrew E. Kramer, “Boris Nemtsov, Putin Foe, Is Shot Dead in 
Shadow of Kremlin,” New York Times, February 27, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/28/world/europe/boris-nemtsov-russian-
opposition-leader-is-shot-dead.html.  
13  Darya Korsunskaya, “Putin Says Russia Must Prevent ‘Color Revolution,’” Reuters, November 20, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-russia-putin-security/putin-says-russia-must-prevent-color-revolution-idUSKCN0J41J620141120. 
14  “Milosovic Extradited,” Guardian, June 29, 2001, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/jun/29/warcrimes.guardianleaders; 
Tina Tsomaia, “Georgia’s Rose Revolution,” Foreign Policy, October 23, 2009, https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/23/georgias-rose-
revolution/.
15  William Schneider, “Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution,’” The Atlantic, December 14, 2004, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2004/12/ukraines-orange-revolution/305157/. 
against potentially dangerous rivals such as Alexander 
Navalny.11 In addition, there were the unsolved murders 
of opposition figures like journalist Anna Politkovskaya, 
who reported critically on the Russian war in Chechnya, 
in 2006, and politician Boris Nemtsov in 2015.12
As Russia turned authoritarian and its economy 
boomed, Moscow began to practice a more assertive 
foreign policy. The flashpoints were first what Moscow 
calls “colored revolutions,” the rising of citizens against 
authoritarian rulers. The Kremlin claimed that these po-
litical uprisings were Western-organized coup d’etats 
against elected leaders.13 It watched unhappily as au-
thoritarian rulers were tossed out in Serbia in 2000 
and Georgia in 2003.14 Moscow strove mightily to en-
sure that President Leonid Kuchma in Kyiv would be 
succeeded by Russia-friendly Viktor Yanukovych in 
2004.15 But, its efforts failed, as the Ukrainian author-
ities’ efforts to seal that election sparked the Orange 
Revolution, which ensured another round of voting 
won by Viktor Yushchenko, an ally of the West.
“ But, even as cooperation with 
the West continued, Putin 
asserted Russia’s privileged 
sta tus in its neighborhood,  
the Near Abroad”
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To the Kremlin, the upheavals in Serbia, Georgia, and 
Ukraine were not domestically driven, but the cre-
ation of the West—especially the United States. By the 
February 2007 Munich Security Conference—after six 
strong years of economic growth, two rounds of NATO 
enlargement, and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine—
Putin delivered a speech laying out the anti-Western 
animus of his policy, and his frankly revisionist aims.16 
Those aims included
  a sphere of influence for Russia that matched the 
territory of the former Soviet Union;
  changing the post-Cold War security order; and
16  Ian Traynor, “Putin Hits at US for Triggering Arms Race,” Guardian, February 10, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/
feb/11/usa.russia. 
17  Ian Traynor, “Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia,” Guardian, May 16, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia. 
18  Associated Press, “A Scripted War,” The Economist, August 14, 2008, https://www.economist.com/briefing/2008/08/14/a-scripted-war. 
19  Vladislav Inozemtsev, “There’ll Be No End to the War between Russia and Ukraine While It Suits Their Political Elites to Keep Fighting,” 
Independent, August 29, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/long_reads/russia-ukraine-war-putin-leaders-crimea-militia-
recognise-kremlin-kiev-diplomacy-nato-us-trump-a8501301.html. 
  weakening NATO, the EU, and transatlantic ties.
Moscow has not been shy in pursuing these aims. In the 
summer of 2007, angry that Estonian officials had de-
cided to relocate a monument to Soviet “liberators” of 
Estonia from Nazi rule, the Kremlin launched a cyber-
attack that shut down numerous services in the coun-
try.17 This was followed by Moscow’s war on Georgia 
in 2008, and its recognition of the “independence” of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia.18 In 2014, after months of 
demonstrations sent Ukrainian president Yanukovych 
packing, the Kremlin seized and “annexed” Crimea, and 
began its not-quite-covert, hybrid war in the Donbas.19
Putin critic and regular regime target Alexei Navalny leading protesters down Tverskaya Street, March 26th 2017.  Photo credit: 
Evgeny Feldman
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 Moscow has not hidden its revisionist objectives. Instead, 
Putin and other senior Russian officials loudly proclaim 
them. In 2008, President Dmitry Medvedev said, “Russia, 
like other countries in the world, has regions where it 
has privileged interests. These are regions where coun-
tries with which we have friendly relations are located.”20 
He added, “It is the border region, but not only.” At the 
11th Valdai Discussion Club Conference in Russia in 2015, 
at which Putin and many other senior Russian officials 
spoke, the theme was “new rules or no rules.”21
The Kremlin Challenge
Moscow is applying a full spectrum of methods to 
achieve these objectives. The combination of these 
tactics is sometimes called hybrid war. An explanation 
of some of these tactics follows. 
20  Paul Reynolds, “New Russian World Order: The Five Principles,” BBC, September 1, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7591610.
stm. 
21  Vladimir Putin, “Meeting Of the Valdai International Discussion Club,” October 24, 2014, Kremlin website, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/46860. 
  It starts with Russian soft power. Moscow claims 
the right to protect ethnic Russians, and even 
Russian speakers, abroad. It uses alleged abuses 
against both groups to justify interventions in 
Moldova, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Estonia, Latvia, 
and elsewhere. At the softer end of this policy, the 
Kremlin has created the concept of Russkiy Mir, or 
the “Russian world,” to attract support for its pol-
icies from Russian communities abroad. A harder 
edge to this policy includes the distribution of 
Russian passports in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, 
and Kazakhstan, in order for Russia to be in a posi-
tion to make claims against those governments on 
behalf of its citizens. 
  Religion is a distinct part of Russian soft power. The 
Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) 
Vladimir Putin’s “little green men” on patrol outside Perevalne military base, Crimea, Ukraine, 9th March 2014.  Photo credit: Anton 
Holoborodko.
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was reestablished by Joseph Stalin during World 
War II, and was a witting agent of Soviet aims.22 
The demise of the Soviet Union and the emer-
gence of an independent Russia did not free the 
Moscow Patriarchate (MP) from state control. The 
MP has parishes throughout Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Moldova, and in the Baltic states.23 Its parishes in 
Ukraine, for instance, provided a platform for op-
posing the Orange Revolution and the Revolution 
of Dignity. The MP has also tried to build opposi-
tion to pro-Western policies by highlighting social 
issues—such as LGBT rights—that are associated 
with the EU and the United States.24 Indeed, with 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church just recently win-
ning its bid to the Patriarch of Constantinople 
for autocephaly, this lingering vestige of Russian 
dominion is now off the board, and represents a 
major step on Ukraine’s path toward the West.25 
The granting of autocephaly by Constantinople 
may mean the loss of a good number of Russian 
Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) par-
ishes in Ukraine, allowing the Ukrainian Church to 
emerge as a rival to the Russian Church in size and 
influence.26
  Disinformation is perhaps the most well-known as-
pect of Russian soft power. Over the past decade, 
Moscow has sought to perfect the art of informa-
tion warfare. It has devoted extensive resources to 
22  Ksenia Luchenko, “Why Do the Russians Trust the Church Set up by the KGB?” Newsweek, February 10, 2018, https://www.newsweek.
com/why-do-russians-trust-church-set-kgb-802635. 
23  “Ecumenical Patriarchate Agrees To Recognize Independence Of Ukrainian Church,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, October 12, 2018, 
https://www.rferl.org/a/constantinople-patriarchate-agrees-to-recognize-independence-of-ukrainian-orthodox-church/29538590.html. 
24  Nikita Sleptcov, “Political Homophobia as a State Strategy in Russia,” Journal of Global Iniatitives: Policy, Pedagogy, Perspective vol. 12, 
no. 1, January 2018, p. 143, https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1234&context=jgi.
25  “Ecumenical Patriarchate Agrees to Recognize Independence of Ukrainian Church.”
26  Taras Kuzio, Why Independence for Ukraine’s Orthodox Church Is an Earthquake for Putin (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2018), 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/why-independence-for-ukraine-s-orthodox-church-is-an-earthquake-for-putin. 
27  Alina Polyakova, Here’s Why You Should Worry About Russian Propaganda (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017), http://www.
atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/here-s-why-you-should-worry-about-russian-propaganda. 
28  “Gazprom Cuts off Ukraine’s Gas Supply,” CNN, January 1, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/01/01/russia.ukraine.
gas/. 
outward-focused media like the television station 
Russia Today and the news agency Sputnik, and 
to social media. It has pioneered the use of post-
modern theory that denies any sort of objective 
truth to undercut straightforward reporting about, 
for instance, the shooting down of the Malaysian 
airliner by a Russian Buk missile over the war zone 
in Donbas in July 2014. Moscow has experimented 
with computer bots to suggest that there is mas-
sive support for its particular memes, and to pro-
mote strife in target countries.27 
  Despite its complaints about Western sanctions, 
Moscow has been quick to punish its neighbors 
with boycotts when they pursue policies that dis-
please it. As Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine came 
close to concluding individual trade deals with the 
EU, Moscow imposed major bans on the sale of 
their goods in Russia.
  The Kremlin has made energy a particularly im-
portant instrument for exerting influence over its 
neighbors. To the extent possible, it would like to 
be a monopoly supplier of gas to its neighbors, 
and to gain control over their gas infrastructure. 
Here, Moscow’s instrument is the state gas com-
pany Gazprom. Gazprom cut off the supply of 
gas to Ukraine in the winters of 2004-2005 and 
2008-2009, to demonstrate dissatisfaction with 
Kyiv’s Western-oriented policies.28 It did the same 
with Belarus, to encourage Gazprom’s purchase of 
Belarus’ gas pipeline. Moscow’s plans to build the 
Nord Stream II pipeline would greatly enhance its 
leverage over Belarus and Ukraine. Nord Stream I 
is not currently filled to capacity; Nord Stream II 
would give Moscow the chance to redirect the flow 
of gas away from Ukraine and Belarus.
  Moscow also makes extensive use of corruption as 
a means of control. Given the prevalence of klep-
tocracy in Russia, this tactic is partly the export of 
a local practice. Moscow understands that corrupt 
officials are easier to blackmail. For much of the 
“Disinformation is perhaps 
the most well-known aspect 
of Russian soft power.  Over 
the past decade Moscow has 
sought to perfect the art of 
information warfare.”
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1990s and 2000s, major gas deals between Ukraine 
and Russia took place between the shadowy in-
termediaries EuroTransGas and RosUkrEnergo.29 
These intermediaries made it easy to divert a gen-
erous portion of the deals’ value to senior privi-
leged insiders in Russia and Ukraine. One of these 
insiders, Dmytro Firtash, who is currently in Austria 
and under an extradition order from the United 
States, has been a major funder of pro-Russian 
activities in Ukraine.30 Moscow has also taken ad-
vantage of corrupt banks in Moldova and corrupt 
customs officials in Odesa to launder money and 
export black-market arms.
  Moscow’s intelligence services, the Federal Bureau 
of Security (FSB) and military intelligence (GRU), 
also play major roles in Russian influence opera-
29  It’s a Gas – Funny Business in the Turkmen-Ukraine Gas Trade (Washington, DC: Global Witness, 2006), https://www.globalwitness.org/
documents/17837/its_a_gas.pdf. 
30  Eric Reguly, “The Rise and Fall of Ukrainian Oligarch Dmitry Firtash,” Globe and Mail, May 12, 2018,https://www.theglobea ndmail.com/
report-on-business/international-business/european-business/the-rise-and-fall-of-ukrainian-oligarch-dmitry-firtash/article18067412/. 
31  Andrew Roth, “How the GRU Spy Agency Targets the West, from Cyberspace to Salisbury,” Guardian, August 6, 2018, https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/06/the-gru-the-russian-intelligence-agency-behind-the-headlines. 
tions.31 Their role is to infiltrate and undermine 
the security organs of neighboring states. Given 
longstanding connections between the security 
services, and the low wages and absence of pro-
fessionalism in the target countries’ security or-
gans, Moscow has enjoyed some success here. 
Estonian troops taking part in joint exercises with NATO, November 2013, two years prior to large scale NATO deployments in the 
Baltic States.  Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons (https://www.flickr.com/photos/sfjz13/10643674296/).
“With the deployment of these 
forces to the East, NATO 
has done much to secure its 
eastern flank. But more needs 
to be done.”
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One of the main reasons Moscow was able to grab 
control of Donetsk and Luhansk in the spring of 
2014 was because the local State Security Service 
and Ministry of Interior chiefs had been suborned 
by the FSB.
  The FSB and GRU are also responsible for kinetic 
operations short of war. These include assassi-
nations of effective Ukrainian military officers far 
from the front in the Donbas, or Russian dissidents 
living in Ukraine.32 They also include efforts to pro-
voke ethnic strife—for instance, in the 2017 opera-
tion that set off bombs at the Polish consulate in 
Lutsk.33 Russian intelligence services have tried to 
raise armed revolts in other parts of Ukraine, such 
as the plot to establish an Odesa People’s Republic 
and a Bessarabian People’s Republic in the spring 
32  Jim Heintz, “What’s GRU? A Look at Russia’s Shadowy Military Spies,” Associated Press, September 6, 2018, https://www.apnews.com/
c91253cf51b446059c360157aa00754e. 
33  Saim Saeed, “Polish Consulate in Ukraine Attacked with Grenade Launcher,” Politico, March 29, 2017, https://www.politico.eu/article/
polish-consulate-in-ukraine-attacked-with-grenade-launcher/. 
34  “Ukrainian MP Was in 2015 Set to Take Lead of ‘Bessarabian People’s Republic’—SBU Chief,” UNIAN, October 9, 2018, https://www.
unian.info/politics/10292343-ukrainian-mp-was-in-2015-set-to-take-lead-of-bessarabian-people-s-republic-sbu-chief.html. 
35  Petar Komnenic, Ivana Sekularac, and Raissa Kasolowsky, “Montenegro Begins Trial of Alleged Pro-Russian Coup Plotters,” Reuters, 
July 19, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-montenegro-election-trial/montenegro-begins-trial-of-alleged-pro-russian-coup-
plotters-idUSKBN1A413F. 
36  Samuel Osborne, “US Warns Russia over Interference in Macedonia Referendum on Changing Name,” Independent, September 17, 2018, 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/macedonia-name-referendum-russia-us-meddling-james-mattis-nato-eu-a8541136.
html. 
37  Traynor, “Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia.”
38  “Ukraine Power Cut ‘was Cyber-attack,’” BBC, January 11, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-38573074. 
of 2015.34 In a 2016 effort to stop Montenegro from 
joining NATO, Moscow’s intelligence services or-
ganized an unsuccessful coup.35 To prevent an end 
to the “naming crisis” between the Republic of 
Macedonia and Greece this year, which could pave 
the way for Skopje’s entering NATO, the Kremlin 
conducted covert operations that jeopardized its 
relations with both countries.36
  Moscow has also used the intelligence services and 
criminal networks to conduct cyber operations. 
NATO recognized that this was a problem when 
Moscow launched a major cyberattack on Estonia 
in the summer of 2007.37 Since the start of its war 
on Ukraine, Moscow has used cyber instruments to 
shut down electricity grids.38
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THE WESTERN RESPONSE TO KREMLIN 
REVISIONISM 
39  Anushka Asthana, “Boris Johnson: Cameron Can’t Cut Immigration and Stay in EU,” Guardian, May 9, 2016, https://www.theguardian.
com/politics/2016/may/09/boris-johnson-cameron-cant-cut-immigration-and-stay-in-eu. 
40  Hélène Mulholland, “David Cameron Calls for Tough EU Sanctions on Russia,” Guardian, September 1, 2008, https://www.theguardian.
com/politics/2008/sep/01/foreignpolicy.conservatives. 
41  Julian Borger, Alec Luhn, and Richard Norton-Taylor, “EU Announces Further Sanctions on Russia after Downing of MH17,” Guardian, 
July 22, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/22/eu-plans-further-sanctions-russia-putin-mh17. 
42  Oren Dorell, “NATO’s New ‘Spearhead’ Force Aims to Reassure Allies,” USA Today, September 6, 2014, https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/world/2014/09/05/nato-spearhead-force-for-aiding-allies/15132141/. 
43  “Securing the Nordic-Baltic Region,” NATO Review, April 3, 2015, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/also-in-2016/security-baltic-
defense-nato/EN/index.htm. 
44  Robin Emmott, Wiktor Szary, Paul Taylor, Yeganeh Torbati, Justyna Pawlak, Gabriela Baczynska, and Sabine Siebold, “Factbox: Main 
Decisions of NATO’s Warsaw Summit,” Reuters, July 9, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-decisions-factbox-
idUSKCN0ZP0MX. 
The major Western powers have been slow to recognize the challenge posed by Putin’s in-creasingly aggressive foreign policy. Indeed, some have understood Kremlin unhappiness 
with the growing appeal of both NATO and the EU to 
the unattached countries on Russia’s periphery and in 
the Balkans. Those powers have advocated for poli-
cies designed to prevent further accessions to those 
organizations. Indeed, some prominent politicians in 
Europe have recently criticized EU plans for a Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) 
with Ukraine, as that agreement ostensibly provoked 
the crisis that led to Moscow’s war on Ukraine.39
There was little criticism of Moscow for the cyberattack 
on Estonia. Deferring to Kremlin sensitivities, NATO did 
not offer Georgia a Membership Action Plan at its April 
2008 summit and, when Moscow’s war against Georgia 
followed months later, the West levied weak sanctions 
on Russia and lifted them quickly.40 The West’s sanc-
tions on Moscow for taking and “annexing” Crimea 
were also not stiff. Even the start of Moscow’s hybrid 
war in the Donbas elicited no strong sanctions from 
the EU, until after the shooting down of the Malaysian 
civilian airliner in July 2014.41
NATO was also slow to recognize Moscow’s revision-
ist challenge to the alliance. While the September 2014 
NATO summit made arrangements for a rapid-deploy-
ment force, it spoke of the need to “reassure” its east-
ernmost allies, rather than to deter the Kremlin.42 Only 
in 2015 did NATO decide to put well-armed battalions 
into the Baltic states, Poland, and Romania to dissuade 
the Kremlin from provocations there.43 This presence was 
ratified at the July 2016 NATO summit, which also recog-
nized the need to deter Moscow.44
With the deployment of these forces, NATO has done 
much to secure its eastern flank, but more needs to be 
done. Kremlin policy in the borderlands is a constant 
menace to the people of this area, and a danger to 
Europe. Unlike the West, Moscow does not seem to 
have the soft power necessary to attract its neighbors 
and forge closer relations. So its methods are coercive, 
ranging the full spectrum listed above, from disinfor-
mation to war. 
The people of these countries are not willing to mort-
gage their futures to Kremlin imperial ambitions. As a 
consequence, a Western policy that attempts to mol-
lify Moscow by sacrificing the interests and hopes of 
the people in the borderlands will not produce peace 
and stability. The notion that the West can buy peace 
by allowing Moscow to manage its neighbors—to ex-
ercise hegemony in its sphere of influence—is com-
pletely wrong. Indeed, the history of the past fifteen 
years demonstrates this. The Kremlin’s war on Tbilisi 
and Kyiv has not dissuaded either capital from its 
Westward course. The same is true of Moscow’s vari-
ous coercive efforts to push Chisinau away from closer 
relations with the EU.
The Need for a Clear Western Policy
All of this points to the need for a new approach, but 
one based on an older idea—one established at the end 
of the Cold War. As noted above, the Charter of Paris, 
building on the Helsinki Final Act, set up principles for 
a safe and secure international order. States are sov-
ereign; they should enjoy territorial integrity and the 
right to choose their own political and economic sys-
tems. They should also enjoy the right to choose their 
international friends and allies. 
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In the 1990s, the EU, NATO, and the United States em-
braced these principles and built their policies around 
them. They offered assistance to all the countries that 
emerged from Soviet ruins and were aiming to transi-
tion to an open society, including Russia. They boldly 
proclaimed their vision of an undivided Europe, whole 
and free. And, while not missionizing, they consid-
ered the sovereign choices of those nations from the 
post-Soviet world that sought admission to NATO and 
the EU. As those applicant nations met the standards 
set, they became members.
This clear policy reflected Western principles and inter-
ests, then and now. The West needs to return to this, ex-
plicitly and with confidence. The United States should 
take the lead within NATO in laying out this vision and 
reminding the allies that, at the Bucharest Summit in 
2008, the door to eventual NATO membership was 
45  Associated Press, “Greece, Macedonia Say New Name of Balkan Country is ‘Republic of Northern Macedonia,’” Associated Press, June 
12, 2018, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-republic-northern-macedonia-20180612-story.html.
left open to Ukraine and Georgia. The recent acces-
sion of Montenegro and the prospective accession of 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, soon to 
be renamed Republic of Northern Macedonia—both 
actively opposed by Moscow—are recent precedents 
for this policy.45
But, the NATO accession process must change to 
take account of the hostile environment that Moscow 
has created. In the 1990s, NATO established the 
Membership Action Plan as a way station for eventual 
membership in the Alliance. With Moscow actively op-
posing membership for new countries, NATO’s granting 
of a Membership Action Plan for a candidate country 
makes it a target of the Kremlin, without conferring 
on it the protection that membership in the Alliance 
offers. This was clear with Moscow’s failed coup in 
Montenegro in the fall of 2016.
President Petro Poroshenko and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, 10th 
July, 2017.  Photo credit: (https://www.president.gov.ua/photos/thumbs/zasidannya-komisiyi-ukrayina-nato-pid-golovuvannyam-
preziden-1162)
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NATO should be willing to consider new criteria for 
membership. It should consider the NATO-Georgia 
Commission and its annual national plans as models 
for membership. As part of this reconsideration, NATO 
should clarify that possible membership cannot be 
blocked by Kremlin aggression or occupation.
This means that the Russian “projects” in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia in Georgia—and in Luhansk, Donetsk, and 
Crimea in Ukraine—are not hindrances to either country 
joining the alliance. Of course, Article 5 security guaran-
tees would not cover the occupied territories in either 
country, if and when they join NATO. There is precedent 
for this; West Germany joined the Alliance in 1955 with-
out withdrawing its claim to East Germany. 
The EU, too, must be clear on membership for its east-
ern neighbors. To its credit, the EU did not step away 
from the DCFTA after Russian aggression against 
Ukraine began, despite timid voices in the West blam-
ing the EU for the “Ukraine crisis.”46 Nor did the EU 
step back from its Eastern Partnership program.
Given the current turmoil in the EU over Brexit, im-
migration, and other issues, it would be too much to 
expect the organization to enunciate a clear policy out-
lining the path to membership for Georgia, Moldova, 
and Ukraine, as well as other countries. But, the EU 
can avoid public statements that would restrict future 
membership as it works out its current problems and 
manages its wide, and complex, relationships. 
46  Charles Grant, “Is the EU to Blame for the Crisis in Ukraine?” Centre for European Reform, June 01, 2016, https://www.cer.eu/insights/
eu-blame-crisis-ukraine.
47  Associated Press, “Greece, Macedonia Say New Name of Balkan Country is ‘Republic of Northern Macedonia,’”
48  Alex Fak and Anna Kotelnikova, “Russian Oil and Gas: Tickling Giants,” Sberbank CIB, May, 2018, http://globalstocks.ru/wp-content/
uploads/2018/05/Sberbank-CIB-OG_Tickling-Giants.pdf. 
49  Tobias Buck, “Nord Stream 2: Gas Pipeline from Russia That’s Dividing Europe,” Irish Times, July 21, 2018, https://www.irishtimes.com/
news/world/europe/nord-stream-2-gas-pipeline-from-russia-that-s-dividing-europe-1.3571552. 
50  Anders Aslund, How the United States Can Combat Russia’s Kleptocracy (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2018), http://www.
atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/how-the-united-states-can-combat-russia-s-kleptocracy.  
In the meantime, the EU should fully develop opportuni-
ties for greater cooperation under the Eastern Partnership. 
It should also keep the door open for additional DCFTAs. 
In this same spirit, the United States should consider free-
trade agreements with Georgia, Ukraine, and other na-
tions in the area, as the situation develops.
Equally important, the EU should make sure that it 
does not short its own interests and dilute its policies 
to suit Kremlin preferences, particularly in ways that 
strengthen Moscow’s hand over its neighbors. This 
is particularly important in the energy area. The EU 
Energy Charter, which Moscow has signed but not rati-
fied, requires Europe’s energy partners to allow the use 
of their pipelines to deliver hydrocarbons to Europe.47 
But, the EU does not insist that Gazprom open its 
pipelines to producers in Central Asia. This oversight 
strengthens Moscow’s hand as an energy supplier to 
Europe, and gives it additional leverage over countries 
that, it claims, fall into its natural sphere of influence.
Just as damaging is the EU’s countenancing the con-
struction of the Nord Stream II pipeline from Russia 
to Germany. As an economic project, Nord Stream II 
makes sense for no nation. (A May 2018 Sberbank re-
port makes the point that the project is only of value 
to vested interests in Russia that will work on the proj-
ect.)48 But, Nord Stream II makes geopolitical sense for 
Russia, because it reduces the country’s need for the 
current pipelines that run through Ukraine and Belarus. 
It is not in Europe’s geopolitical or energy interests to 
help increase Russian energy leverage. The European 
Commission has the power to stop this project.49 If 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel will not, or cannot, 
turn off Nord Stream II, the commission should do so. 
NATO and the EU should also maintain and enhance 
policies designed to help the countries of the bor-
derlands strengthen domestic vulnerabilities that the 
Kremlin has exploited to promote its influence. This 
must include programs designed to limit corruption, 
and to clean up the banking sector. Moscow continues 
to buy influence through corruption, and the banking 
system is a prime facilitator—as well as a means for 
money laundering.50 While Georgia has taken great 
strides to clean up its banking sector and reduce 
“NATO and the EU should 
also maintain and enhance 
policies designed to help the 
countries of the borderlands 
to strengthen domestic 
vulnerabilities that the Kremlin 
has exploited to promote its 
influence.””
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corruption, much more needs to be done in Ukraine 
and Moldova. The West’s support reforms through the 
use of conditional aid is an essential tool. 
The security organs are another vulnerability. After the 
Soviet Union fell apart, Russia’s FSB and GRU made 
sure to retain and place agents in their counterpart 
ministries in neighboring countries. In the Donbas, 
when a large number of police and secret police joined 
the Russian hybrid war against Ukraine in spring 2014, 
Kyiv learned how dangerous this can be. 
Ukraine has done a great deal since those dark days of 
2014 to clean up its security agencies. But, more can be 
done, there and in Moldova. The United States or other 
NATO partners, such as the UK or Poland, should offer 
51  RFE/RL, “U.S. Condemns Russian ‘Harassment’ Of Shipping In Sea Of Azov,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, August 31, 2018, https://
www.rferl.org/a/u-s-calls-on-russia-cease-harassment-international-shipping-sea-azov-/29462170.html.
a program to vet Ukraine’s officials in the Ministries of 
Defense and Interior and in its security services. This 
will be easier to do if there are parallel efforts to root 
out corruption.
Security Assistance in the Short and Medium 
Terms
Russia is currently occupying and militarizing Ukrainian 
Crimea, conducting a simmering, hybrid war in the 
Donbas, and obstructing Ukrainian shipping in the Sea 
of Azov.51 Moscow launched a war against Georgia in 
2008, and its “peacekeepers” in South Ossetia peri-
odically move the line of demarcation farther into 
Georgia. The United States and NATO have provided 
both Ukraine and Georgia with training and military 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus are also part of the grey zone. They receive less attention because they have not pursued closer 
relations with the EU (or NATO) as energetically as Georgia and Ukraine, and, therefore, have received less pressure from the 
Kremlin.   Photo credit: (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nikol_Pashinyan_April_17_General_Prosecutor%27s_Office.jpg )
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equipment.52 Under the Donald Trump administration, 
the United States, at long last, has provided lethal 
weapons—Javelin missiles—to both countries.
The United States and its allies should consider further 
weapons transfers to Georgia, and especially to Ukraine. 
Stopping Kremlin revisionism is a vital Alliance interest. 
The front in this struggle is currently in Eastern Ukraine. 
This justifies an annual Western aid package of $1 bil-
lion for five years for military equipment.53 It should in-
clude regular needs, such as anti-tank missiles, secure 
command-and-control communications, sophisticated 
drones, and anti-aircraft radar for missiles. It should also 
include anti-aircraft equipment and anti-ship missiles, 
to dissuade Moscow from using air power or launching 
amphibious operations against Ukraine.
Under the same logic, the United States should consult 
with Georgia on its military needs. The United States, 
with its NATO allies, should also consider a greater 
presence in the Black Sea region. Regular exercises 
with Georgia and Ukraine should be enhanced, as 
should port visits to Batumi and Odesa. Romania is a 
natural partner with which to develop a more robust 
program, and the United States should consider ways 
to draw Turkey and Bulgaria into greater cooperation. 
It would also be useful for the United States and the 
EU to consider a proactive use of sanctions to deter 
further Kremlin aggression. To date, sanctions have 
been used to punish the Kremlin for past sins, but they 
also can be used to discourage further aggression.54 
They can, and should, be applied in specific instances: 
when despite a “ceasefire,” the Kremlin keeps taking 
more territory in the Donbas, and when it moves the 
line of demarcation another fifty meters into the rest of 
Georgia. The United States and the EU should also look 
closely at Kremlin provocations in the Sea of Azov, and 
consider an appropriate response. Perhaps it should 
not permit Russian ships sailing from ports in the Sea 
of Azov to call at European and US ports, so long as 
Moscow is obstructing Ukrainian shipping there. 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus
This paper has focused principally on Georgia and 
Ukraine, and, to a lesser degree, Moldova. But, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Belarus are also part of the grey zone. 
They receive less attention because they have not 
52  Josh Lederman, “Officials: U.S. Agrees to Provide Lethal Weapons to Ukraine,” USA Today, December 23, 2017 https://www.usatoday.
com/story/news/politics/2017/12/22/lethal-weapons-ukraine/978538001/.
53  Sabrina Siddiqui, “House Approves $1 Billion Aid Package For Ukraine,” Huffington Post, March 07, 2014 https://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2014/03/06/house-ukraine-aid_n_4913495.html.
54  Patricia Zengerle, “U.S. Senators Introduce Russia Sanctions ‘bill from Hell’,” Reuters, August 03, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-russia-sanctions/us-senators-introduce-russia-sanctions-bill-from-hell-idUSKBN1KN22Q.
pursued closer relations with the EU (or NATO) as en-
ergetically as Georgia and Ukraine, and, therefore, have 
received less pressure from the Kremlin. Still, they have 
been subject to pressure.
Moscow’s stance on the disputed region of Nagorno-
Karabakh is designed partly to provide a lever on Baku, 
which—from Moscow’s point of view—cooperates too 
closely with the West on energy issues. Russian economic 
Ukrainian cadet scans the area for simulated opposing 
forces during exercise Rapid Trident 2014 in Yavoriv Ukraine.  
Photo Credit: (https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/
commons/2/20/A_Ukrainian_cadet_scans_the_area_
for_simulated_opposing_forces_during_exercise_Rapid_
Trident_2014_in_Yavoriv%2C_Ukraine%2C_Sept_140923-A-
DO651-001.jpg)
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pressure persuaded Yerevan to walk away from a DCFTA 
with Brussels.55 And, Moscow has put serious pressure 
(including a gas cutoff) on close ally Belarus, and is now 
looking for a permanent military base there.56
The United States and the EU should look for ways to 
increase cooperation with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and 
Belarus. The West cannot ignore the human-rights sit-
uation in Azerbaijan (nor, indeed, abuses in Armenia 
and Belarus), but that should be one item on the 
agenda. It should not be forgotten that, if Baku moves 
closer to Moscow, the prospects for human-rights im-
provements in Azerbaijan drop sharply.
The West should also take advantage of the recent 
political opening in Yerevan. The EU should not push, 
but it should let new President Armen Sarkissian know 
that the DCFTA Yerevan rejected two years ago is still 
on the table. Washington should also let Yerevan know 
that the door is open to better relations.
The West’s policy of minimal contact with the gov-
ernment of Belarus has yielded little fruit. Washington 
55  Laurence Peter, “Armenia Rift over Trade Deal Fuels EU-Russia Tension,” BBC News, September 05, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-23975951.
56  Alastair Macdonald, “Eyeing Possible Polish U.S. Base, Belarus Says No Russian Base, For...,” Reuters, May 31, 2018, https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-belarus-eu/eyeing-possible-polish-us-base-belarus-says-no-russian-base-for-now-idUSKCN1IW339.
and the EU should offer Minsk talks on relations with 
the West, and regarding the situation in the region. 
President Alexander Lukashenko would welcome that 
as at least a small card to play as he tries to fend off 
Kremlin plans to establish a military base in his country.
The expansion of NATO and the EU since the mid-
1990s launched an unparalleled period of stability and 
prosperity in Europe and beyond. This process stalled 
once Moscow began to push back hard in Georgia and 
then Ukraine, and as the EU was hit with the immigra-
tion crisis and Brexit. Now that the West has taken the 
measure of Moscow’s policy—and recognizes its revi-
sionist aims—it should be clear that accepting Kremlin 
prerogatives in the borderlands is no recipe for peace.
A determined West has the power to make it easier 
for the countries of this region to choose their own 
future. Both its principles and its interests make this 
the right decision.
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